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INTRODUCTION: INPUT, INTAKE AND DISCOURSE SEMANTICS 
A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT of second language acquisition research has been 
done into characteristic features of the process of negotiation for meaning inNS 
(native speaker) and (NNS)non-native speaker dyads, and in NNS-NNS dyads 
(see Pica 1992 for a summary of this research). This research has been largely 
descriptive and has not often addressed explanatory issues regarding the 
relationship of the input features studied to claims about representation, and 
how changes in representations of target language features can be triggered 
through discourse interaction. Where models of the intake process have been 
put forward (e.g. Chaudron 1985) they have made reference to causal variables 
like attention, memory and processing constraints as possible features of 
explanations for how target language syntax comes to be acquired (Pienemann 
1989: Schmidt 1992); the issue of lexical development, and changes in the 
representation of lexical form that result from negotiation for meaning-
including the learner's knowledge of such intensional features as sense 
relations and componential knowledge- has not been their main concern. It 
would seem plausible, however, that theoretical work on the propositional 
representation of lexical form ( e.g. Wilensky 1990), possible world semantics 
(Stalnaker 1978), situation semantics (Barwise & Perry 1983), as well as 
relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986) might provide starting points for 
theorising about the relationship of negotiated input to reorganisational 
processes underlying second language development since this work makes 
claims about the relationship of inferencing procedures to semantic 
representations. No theoretical work in SLA to date, though, has made 
reference to semantic theories like those cited above or attempted to model the 
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semantics of the intake process. My aim in this paper is to cover basic issues in 
semantic theory as a preliminary to specifying such a model by showing how 
semantic criteria can provide a point of departure for pragmatic decisions 
about which word to choose in interactive spoken discourse. My listing of 
these semantic criteria will not be exhaustive, as it is the relationship between 
them and their pragmatic operationalization in discourse that I hope to 
demonstrate. I will be particularly concerned with native speaker, non-native 
speaker conversations, and with drawing some conclusions from the 
interaction of 'semantic' competence and 'phonological' competence for 
pedagogy. 
1. Semantic Competence and Sense Relations 
Blum-Kulka and Levenston (1983) describe what they call features of a 
universal'semantic competence' which enables second language learners to 
adopt strategies for expressing complex meanings using simple, minimal 
vocabulary. This competence includes knowledge of sense relations such as 
synoymy, superordinacy, antonymy etc.: 
The learner's need to simplify is thus explained by the complexity of 
acquiring command of all aspects of the native speaker's semantic 
competence; his ability to do so derives from his own semantic 
competence in his own language. As a native speaker he will at times 
experience a need for paraphrase and circumlocution, for hyponymy 
and synonymy ... (while) as a language learner he is compelled to 
reorganize semantic fields in the early stages, when he lacks 
vocabulary, and to do so according to the principles that govern his 
semantic competence as a native speaker. (1983:120) 
Here is a diagram showing some of these sense relations: 
superordinate: 
hyponyms: 
antonym: 
synonym: 
(inclusion) fruit 
apple, pear, banana, etc. 
expensive~ cheap 
expensive= dear 
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As Hutchinson and Waters have shown, (1981) a knowledge of sense relations 
can be useful to learners in establishing sameness of meaning so they can 
restate or paraphrase in the absence of a word in the target language. For 
instance the meaning of 'ductile' can be restated using the simpler words, 
'change' and 'shape', and the synonym 'stretch'. 
Consequently teaching materials tend to draw attention to sense relations in 
presenting and testing vocabulary (see Gairns & Redman 1986: Morgan & 
Rincvolucri 1986). 
But all such relations are, of course, only provisional, - 'potentially' there, 
- a fixed semantic 'structure' from which to proceed as a 'starting point' in 
negotiation. The crucial question seems to be not how do we present learners 
with a static, monolithic system of sense relations to be fixed in declarative 
knowledge- but how do we develop the ability to act on this provisional 
structure procedurally: what areas of semantic knowledge are involved here? 
2. Semantic Knowledge: Dependency Relations 
What I have elsewhere called 'procedural' words (1989) are often used in place 
of other words, thereby achieving paraphrase or definition through 
establishing relations of simple synonymy or superordinacy (see Faerch and 
Kasper 1983 on 'achievement strategies'), they have an extensive relational 
capacity. For example: 
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Restatement through Synonyms: 
What does acquir~ get something. 
~ 
What is direction? It is a way to go somewhere. 
Restatement through Superordinacy: 
What is a rose~wer. 
What is keros~el. 
Which is the procedural word in this group, i.e. which would be most useful in 
defining other words in the group? 
gobble, dine, devour, eat, stuff, gormandize 
(an example from Carter 1986) 
Could you define 'dine' using 'gobble'? Hardly, but all of them can be defined 
or paraphrased using 'eat'; 
gobble- to eat quickly and carelessly 
dine- to eat, usually at night, in formal surroundings etc. 
In dependency theory (see Hudson 1984) a distinction is made between 
heads and modifiers, heads being the construction (in this case 'word') on 
which the modifier depends. I have shown this using the arrows in the 
diagrams above. So, eat, flower and fuel are the 'heads' in the sentences above, 
while they are 'modified' by the more specific words. This means, as heads, 
words like 'eat' can be used in place of modifier words like 'stuff', 
'gormandize' etc. but the reverse is not possible, and this is because it 
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contradicts the semantic direction of dependency. This, then, is a 'unilateral 
dependency' (see Brown, Miller 1981 for a taxonomy of dependency types). 
Some dependencies though are 'bilateral', i.e. both words can be seen as 
simultaneously heads and modifiers. For example; 
You really stuffed that food down. 
What do you mean? 
You bolted it down in about two minutes ... 
This relationship is reversible. The difference between these relations in 
traditional propositional calculus notation is between implication (stuff~ eat) 
and equivalence (stuffed = bolted) (see Lyons 1977:144). 
3. Assertions and Presuppositions 
Demonstrating the difference between the relata involved in this type of lexical 
dependency relationship (i.e. bilateral dependents) and between 'eat' and 
'stuff' (i.e. unilateral dependents) can be also be done by referring to the 
assertion-presupposition distinction, as Hudson (1986:97) notes. I will 
introduce this distinction here as it is taken up later on. Firstly I am going to 
identify lexical items as the vehicles for assertions. Meanings are asserted 
through words which are prepositionally complex. The meaning of an asserted 
lexical item, when it is a dependent, presupposes the meaning of its head, but 
not vice versa. Why is this? 
a) Assertions 
There are two points to make about assertions here which bear on a 
possible answer to this question. 
3.i The first is semantic. Assertions have content, and this content is 
propositional (See Stalnaker 1978). Where what is asserted is the 
meaning of a lexical item this is made up of propositions derived from 
a knowledge of the semantic structure of the word. This structure can 
be expressed as a network of dependencies. The problems speakers 
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face here is whether they 'agree' upon the semantic facts about such 
structures i.e. the dependencies I have described above and those to be 
described in 4 below. This agreement constitutes an agreement as to 
the 'truth value' of the assertion. This involves an agreement that it 
has the 'meaning postulates' it is asserted to have, or the 'hierarchy of 
components' (described in 4 below) which are entailed by it. 
3.ii The second point is pragmatic. Assertions also take place in contexts 
which constrain the interpretation of assertions. The problem speakers 
face here is whether they 'understand' what facts each is representing 
as the case about the utterance value of the proposition. In a later 
section 8, I will be showing how contextual information, in the form of 
a shared knowledge of the way some features of intonation structure 
interact with lexical choice, informs perceptions of lexical meaning. 
(Brazil 1985: McCarthy 1987). This is a part of the means for 
expressing what Lyons (1981) calls the 'subjectivity of utterance' 
(1981:240). 
Point 3.i concerns the 'agreement' participants in discourse have about the 
semantic 'content' of an asserted lexical item. Point 3.ii concerns the 
'understanding' they have about the 'context' of utterance. To what extent can 
the two be shown to overlap in establishing the 'possible words' speakers 
construct in offering and receiving assertions, or lexical meanings? 
It is important to try to describe or represent the overlap in some way. 
Lyons describes the inadequacy of a semantics based solely on an analysis of 
the truth-conditional means of expressing propositional relationships resulting 
only in the 'agreement' on assertions described above in 3.i e.g. the 
relationships of~ and ¢:::>. (1981:24D-2410). Mason further argues for the need 
to, 'try to come to see the discipline of semantics as encompassing what is 
commonly held to be pragmatics'. (1986:187). 
My aim later in Section 8 is to try and represent, by using a device based 
on the 'propositional' matrices used by Stalnaker (1978), the overlap or 
'cohabitation' of content and context in determining the different 'possible 
worlds' constructed in offering and receiving asserted lexical meanings. In 
other words, this concerns the interrelationship of declarative 'semantic' 
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knowledge of relations like 'synonymy' with procedural knowledge of how 
they are negotiated in discourse. My concern is not to 'fuse' the two, (unlike 
Mason 1986) but to show their 'cohabitation'. The possible 'coreness' of 
asserted meanings, or lexical items, will then be shown to have at least two 
dimensions. Not only the 'semantic' but also the 'pragmatic' dimension. These 
are present concurrently in the construction of 'possible worlds' which 
speakers attempt to bring to convergence through discourse. In this and the 
next three sections of this paper I will stay within semantics, decisions about 
what 'truth value' to attach to the content of an assertion, or lexical item-
while in sections 6 and 7 I will turn to the dimension of context and the 
utterance value attached to lexical choice. 
b) Presuppositions 
Let us say that part of what is asserted is the meaning of 'stuff' in the sense 
of 'stuff with food' and that it takes place in the context of a conversation 
between a language teacher and a language learner. Each participant brings to 
bear on the conversation certain 'presuppositions'. These are the propositions 
assumed to be true as the background to the conversation. If the learner 
questions the meaning that is asserted by the word 'stuff', the teacher, bearing 
in mind the learning context, will relexify the word as 'eat'. Why not relexify 
as 'bolt', as in the example above? Because she presupposes the headword is 
more likely to be available to the learner than a word like 'bolt'. 
Why is this? One proposal has been that 'eat' is a core component of 'stuff' 
in the hypothetical, static structuralist lexicon, and that this constitutes a 
proposition that the teacher assumes is likely to be available to the learner; part 
of the 'semantic base' of subsequent negotiations. Propositions, and therefore 
semantic components, which are part of the definition of an asserted lexical 
item, can, as a result, be presupposed as part of its semantic structure. The 
headword is a core component which is treated as a proposition each party 
presupposes the other accepts as true, i.e. that it is implicated by its dependent. 
At this point I have to distinguish between presupposition based on the sense 
or intension of a term and on the denotation or extension it has. 
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c) Presupposition and Intension: Scalar Implicatures 
The hypothetically static structured lexicon is the one presumed to be 
available in discussing the intension of lexical items which are inherently non-
variable. For example, scalar implicatures are an example of the strict 
implicatural inheritance of properties or intensions of a lexical item. e.g. 
1. All of the boys went to the party 
2. Some of the boys went to the party 
In this example 1, implies 2, but not vice versa. The two words 'all' and 
'some' form an 'implicational scale < all, some > in which the right most 
member always implicates, via Grice's maxim of quantity, that the left most 
member does not apply. 1 entails 2, but 2 implies that 1 is not the case, 
otherwise, following Grice's maxim that speakers follow the obligation to "i) 
make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes 
of the exchange ii) do not make your contribution more information than is 
required" (Grice 1975) the speaker would have been bound to use 1 and not 2. 
Other examples of such scales are; 
< must, should, may > 
< always, often, sometimes > (from Levinson 1983:134) 
d) Presupposition and extension: Prototypes 
However there is a sense in which core components are variable from 
individual to individual, and not static in the way the intensions of a term are. 
This is to treat components as 'criteria! features' used in the formation of 
prototypes of the meaning of a word. Here we will be discussing the extension 
of word meanings in experience, as opposed to their intension in the static 
lexicon. 
The notion of 'prototypes' has been extensively discussed in a variety of 
contexts- (Rosch 1973, 1974; Armstrong, Gleibnan & Gleitman 1982; Smith & 
Medlin 1981) in relation to word-meaning and category formation: (Hudson 
1980, 1983) in relation to sociolinguistic variation and linguistic structure: 
(Barret 1983; Robinson 1988a) in relation to vocabulary teaching and the early 
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acquisition of word meaning. A category is prototypical to the extent that it is 
represented by an exemplar which has a number or cluster of features which 
are regarded as 'criteria!'. Distance from the prototype, or lack of typicality is 
accounted for by pointing to the fact that a less prototypical category member 
lacks a number of criteria! features. Prototypes, unlike scalar i.mplicatures and 
intensions, are inherently variable. This is because they involve knowledge of 
the world. For example the concept of 'fashionable', the prototype 
representing a typically 'fashionable' person, changes to accommodate the 
changing criteria! features which are added and dropped from the exemplars 
representing the prototype- flares, fishnet stockings, maxis, minis, Levi SOl's 
etc. 
Prototypes allow us to accommodate changing knowledge of the world by 
adding or dropping criteria! features to our categorial representations. This is 
also important in conversation. Grice's maxim of relevance applies here. 
Although an initially offered comparison between two things may be first be 
unclear to one participant he will assume it is relevant and attempt to 'see what 
the other means'. 
Seeing what somebody means 'by X ... ' is largely a process of negotiating 
the criteria! features of the concept, accommodating the others point of view 
about what the new exemplar should be. This involves participants in building 
conditional prototypes which are relevant to particular conversations and 
become the means by which participants bring discourse worlds into 
convergence. The convergence or agreement reached may be as much for the 
purposes of establishing 'solidarity' as it is for representing the world as it 
'really is'. 
For example, if one person (B) describes Johnson as a 'whale', assuming 
that his 'fatness' established a criteria! link between this person and the whale, 
then it is a shared criteria! feature for him. (See Levinson on the feature 
transfer theory of metaphor 1983). e.g. 
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B: 
Johnson whale 
+clerk +wet 
+bald +ocean 
-going 
+old 
But the second party (A) may not make this link because 'fat' is not normally a 
criteria! feature of his prototype whale. e.g. 
A: 
Johnson 
+clerk 
+fat 
+short-sighted 
whale 
+wet 
+ocean 
-going 
+dangerous 
However (A) may temporarily for the purposes of establishing 'common 
ground' between himself and (B) agree to include this feature. 
A: 'How do you mean 'whale'? ... 
B: Fat. . .. .. 
A: Oh yes, he's fat. ..... 
(A) may disagree of course, but whether he does or not he has at least to see the 
'possibility' that the other evokes by referring to Johnson's 'whaleness', i.e. that 
Johnson is fat, or further repair is necessary e.g. 
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A: 'How to you mean 'whale'? ... 
B: Fat ..... . 
A: Fat, are whales fat? .. . 
B: Of course they are .. . 
A: Oh, O.K. then ... ' 
Seeing the possibility, or constructing the possible world the other evokes, 
thus involves altering assumptions about prototypes which we have to do to 
accommodate newly negotiated information about possible criteria! features 
relevant in a discourse which has, as its conversational goal, the convergence of 
the discourse worlds of the participants. The possible world may involve 
constructing a temporary sub-lexicon to incorporate the temporarily negotiated 
features. 
e) Truth Maintenance: Monotonicity and Non-Monotonicity 
To summarize the distinction I have made; presuppositions based on 
intensions, like scalar implicatures, draw on a knowledge of fixed implicatural 
relations which are non-variable. In this sense the truth value of a proposition 
is a function of the user's shared, invariant knowledge of these relations. 
'Dining' is always 'eating'. 'Some' will always implicate 'not all'. 
Presuppositions based on extensions, however, the knowledge of what 
features are criteria! to a particular exemplar which represents a typical 
category member, are variable and can be negotiated. That hat may not always 
be fashionable, to that person, in that country etc. 
Both sorts of declarative knowledge are drawn on in procedures for 
overcoming breakdowns in communications. The first is drawn on as a means 
of 'fixing' the meaning of a word or phrase (for B) and does not involve 
recourse to (A's) differential 'knowledge of the world' as part of the 
negotiation. The second is involved in 'negotiating' or 'coming to see' (A's) 
viewpoint, and accommodating it (or not) within the framework of (B's) 
knowledge of the world. Traditionally 'fixing' the intension and, 'negotiating' 
viewpoint are referred to as establishing 'sense' and 'denotation' respectively 
(See Lyons 81:60 and 160). 
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In Doyle's terms {1979) the logic used in maintaining the truth of 
invariable propositions is 'monotonic', that used in maintaining the truth of 
potentially variable and revisable propositions is 'non-monotonic.' This is to 
accommodate the fact that sometimes we discover that assumptions we had 
taken to be true are in fact false and we have to rereason, as it were, our 
propositional world. Since sense is fixed it is maintained monotonically. 
Maintaining the truth of denotation, which I have suggested involves 'coming' 
to see the viewpoint of the other participant, may involve revising assumptions 
about prototypes so as to accommodate the other's way of seeing. This 
revision is done non-monotonically. 
To return for a moment to pedagogy, I suggest that the relexifications 
which are most usually apparent in NS-NNS discourse {see Blum and 
Levenston 1983: Robinson 1989, 1992) are of a type that draw on knowledge of 
the presuppositions based on 'intension' of the type described in Section 1 and 
2) above. This is perhaps because NS interlocutors assume that the NNS's 
knowledge of the world, or its wording in the L2, is insufficient for them to 
engage sufficiently well in non-monotonic reasoning, and consequently the 
negotiation procedures in d) above will tend to be underdeveloped or 
'avoided' {Faerch, Kasper 1983). The NS, in short, will concentrate in 
relexification on imparting a declarative knowledge of the intensions of the 
static lexicon and not on developing non-monotonic reasoning. Consequently 
the negotiating procedures in d) above will tend to be underdeveloped or 
'avoided' {Faerch, Kasper 1983). This is a 'reduction' (Faerch, Kasper 1983) 
strategy based on the NS's perceptions of the processing limitations likely to be 
attendant on the NNS's discourse ability. But if overused this strategy has 
dangerous consequences. 
Firstly, the negotiating ability is never fully developed, and Wells has 
shown it to be vital to developing competence in the L1, {1981, 1985). Secondly, 
as White {1987) has recently pointed out, such carefully tailored input 
{'comprehensible' in Krashen's terms 1982) lacks precisely that extra 
dimension, or n+1, which Krashen and others have suggested is vital to 
elaborating knowledge of the target language. In short, by consistently 
reverting to procedures based on intensional knowledge of the lexicon and so 
to monotonic reasoning, the NS is likely to be depriving the learner by failing 
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to give practice in the equally important dimension of non-monotonic meaning 
negotiation. The result is that the learner will be possessed of a semantic 'base' 
lexicon, but unsure about how to construct provisional'discourse' lexicons. 
(see 8 and 9). Yet it is these 'semantic contingency' procedures which ensure 
further learning, and the flow of input•. 
I will now turn to another type of 'relation' underlying the language user's 
'semantic' competence. 
4. Semantic Knowledge; Constituency Relations 
'Eat' appears, from the examples in 2 above, to have greater procedural value, 
and this is a pragmatic point about what it can be used for in teacher-learner 
contexts, and depends on our ability to establish a dependency relation 
between it and another word. 'Head' words like 'eat' can be used to replace a 
greater number of words than words like 'gormandize'. This is because, 
perhaps, the heads constitute a sort of superordinate semantic node in the 
network of conceptual relations. 
Looked at in this way those words at the bottom of the trees 'inherit' the 
properties of all those higher up, so that every 'constituent' inherits the 
properties of higher nodes. We can show this using the isa notation from AI, 
which moves up the tree, as in this often cited example: 
HUMAN 
/ ""' +MALE -MALE 
/ ""' / ""' +ADULT -ADULT +ADULT -ADULT 
man boy woman girl 
1 Snow (1977) has identified the importance of contingency procedures, which typically occupy 
third moves in parent-child discourse, toLl acquisition. The distinction between presuppositional 
and propositional procedures which I make in section 9 of this paper could also be applied to the 
analysis of how semantic contingency is demonsuated in parent-child discourse. 
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McCawley, referred to in Lyons (1977:603), claims that 'buxom' in the 
following example carries with it the presupposition that whoever it describes, 
and therefore the referent of 'my neighbor', is female. 
My neighbor is buxom. 
Presumably then, using the tree above we can add that it semantically 
presupposes the referent is +ADULT, +WOMAN and so on until'buxom' is 
reached. In this way componential presuppositions are inherited from up, but 
not from down, the tree. How are the relations I have described acted on in 
discourse? 
One point to make is that these hierarchical trees do not operate like scalar 
implicatures, by following the maxim of informativity as described above. 
They can be the bases for 'semantic' presuppositions about componential 
entailment, but not 'pragmatic' presuppositions about the implicatures that 
lexical choice can generate. For example, compare the scalar implicature in a) 
with the componential entailment in b); 
a) <all, some> 
b) <gormandize, dine, eat> 
Here it isn't the case in b), as it is in a) that the right most choice always 
implicates a left most choice is not true. i.e. whereas 'gormandize' appears to 
entail'dine' and 'eat', in the same way that 'all' entails 'some', it isn't the case 
that 'I am going out to eat tonight' implies 'not dining'. In the first of these 
strings implicatures are generated by observing strictly semantic sense 
relations. In the second the basis of generating implicature depends on 
knowledge of context. Let me illustrate the second of these. Take the string 
<alsatian, dog, animal> and consider Lyons 'observation that sense and 
denotation are in a converse relationship i.e. the more specific the sense, as in 
'alsation', the smaller the area of denotation, while the less specific the sense, as 
in 'animal', the larger the area of denotation. What would we expect to be the 
most neutral choice of specificity in generating implicature? 
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Cruse (1977) has pointed out that what Brown (1973) calls 'basic level 
concepts' are important in deciding on the neutral level of specificity form 
which to generate implicatures following the 'Quantity' maxim. e.g. in a choice 
between animal, dog and alsation, although 'animal' is the least specific choice 
it is not the most pragmatically neutral. e.g. 
animal 
I think I'll take the dog for a walk. 
alsation 
Choice of 'animal' here is an under specification which implies dislike, 
choice of 'Alsation' implies more than one dog. Cruse suggests, following 
Brown (1973) that 'dog' is in fact the most neutral term and can be called a 
basic level concept because it is more often the case that the fact that an alsation 
is a dog is more important than that it is an animal. 
However we can well imagine a context in which it is the case that the fact 
that an alsation is an animal is more important than the fact that it is a dog. 
This is a world in which all animals, except human beings and three dogs, 
have died out. Surely now it is the fact that the alsation is an animal that is 
important. It is the last link with an almost extinct animal kingdom. To say 
'animal' in this context would in no way imply dislike, as it would in present 
society. 
The conclusion is then that there is no inherent fit, between the 
constituency type hierarchy of componential relations and the levels of 
neutrality or base specificity which are used in generating implicatures. These 
shift with the creation of new contextualizing 'possible worlds'. It is to 
characterizing these that I now turn. 
5. Possible Words and Possible Worlds 
In conversation, Stalnaker observes, " ... it is part of the concept of 
presupposition that a speaker assumes that the members of his audience 
presuppose everything he presupposes. We may define a NONDEFECTIVE 
CONTEXT as one in which the presuppositions of the various participants in 
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the conversation are all the same. A DEFECTIVE CONTEXT will have a kind 
of instability, and will tend to adjust to the equilibrium of a nondefective 
context. Because hearers will interpret the purposes and content of what is said 
in terms of their own presuppositions, any unnoticed discrepancies between 
the presuppositions of speaker and addresses is likely to lead to a failure of 
communications. Since communication is the point of the enterprise, everyone 
will have a motive to try to keep the presuppositions the same ... " (1978:322). 
In Sections 3 and 4 I have described the dependencies which constitute the 
semantic knowledge speakers have of the presuppositions underlying the 
asserted meaning of a lexical item, (whether these are called 'components' or 
'meaning postulates' is unimportant here). The restatements in Section 2 are 
therefore a way of clearing up, or bringing presuppositions into convergence so 
as to create a 'nondefective context'. 
As I said in Section 3.i this essentially involves participants 'agreeing' 
upon the semantic 'facts' about structural dependencies. In Section 3.ii I 
referred to another problem speakers have. This is the problem of 
'understanding' what facts each is representing as the case in making an 
assertion. The distinction I am making is based on the two dimensional matrix 
for expressing the differences between 'possible words' used by Stalnaker 
(1978). Here is Stalnaker's explanation of the first dimension of his matrix 
which I wish to suggest corresponds to that knowledge of a lexical item 
described in Section 3.i., the truth value which it has as a function of the 
'agreement' about its componential structure. 
'Supposing for convenience of exposition that there is just a small finite 
number of possible states of the world, we might represent a proposition by 
enumerating the truth values that it has in the different possible words, as in 
the following matrix: 
1 k 
T F T 
i, j and k are the possible worlds- the different possible sets of facts that 
determine the truth value of the proposition.' (1978:317) 
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Taking a conversation between a native-speaker teacher (i) and two 
learners G and k) as our context we can use a similar matrix to express the 
different presuppositions they have about the truth value or componential 
structure of a lexical item. For example, (i) says, to a fourth party (x) about a 
fifth party (y), "She's rather buxom". Twill be entered in the matrix under (i). 
Because G) 'agrees' about the facts - has the same tree-like is a hierarchy of 
components as (i),- then Tis entered under G), but a third party, (k) disagrees 
about the facts, possibly because he lacks the word, or is mistaken about its 
components, thinking, for example, that buxom means 'ugly'. F would then be 
entered under (k), giving us a matrix like this; 
i j k 
T T F 
It is important that we can express this agreement and disagreement 
because in semantic terms it would lead us to expect that (i) and 0) would 
agree on 'synonyms' for 'buxom' (e.g. 'pretty' etc.) whereas (k) would disagree 
with them, thinking perhaps 'unattractive' would be a synonym. 
But this is not the entire story. There is another dimension to the matrix, 
that of context- or 'understanding' what was said (3.ii). In Sections 6 and 7 I 
will turn to the means of 'identifying what was said', the phonological options 
available to speaker-hearers, which contribute to their understanding of 
asserted lexical items on this dimension. Meanwhile here is Stalnaker's 
explanation of the second dimension, to which I suggest 3.ii corresponds: "But 
there is also a second way that the facts enter into the determination of the 
truth value of what is expressed in an utterance: It is a matter of fact that an 
utterance has the content which it has. What one says- the proposition he 
expresses- is itself something that might have been different if the facts had 
been different; and if one is mistaken about the truth value of an utterance, this 
is sometimes to be explained as a misunderstanding of what was said rather 
than as a mistake about the truth value of what was actually said." (1978:317): 
Stalnaker then gives an example of how the matrix can be filled out on these 
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two dimensions. 'Let me give a simple example: I (i) said 'You are a fool' to 
O'Leary G>· O'Leary IS a fool, so what I said was true, although O'Leary does 
not think so. now Daniels G), who is no fool, and who knows it, was standing 
nearby, and he thought I was talking to him. So both O'Leary and Daniels 
thought I said something false: O'Leary understood what I said, but disagrees 
with me about the facts; Daniels, on the other hand, agrees with me about the 
fact (he knows that O'Leary is a fool), but misunderstands what I said. Just to 
fill out the example, let me add that O'Leary believes falsely that Daniels is a 
fool.' (1978:317). 
Here is the resulting matrix. 
i k 
i T F T 
j T F T 
k F T F 
If we read columns DOWN the matrix we can differentiate between the 
different truth values each speaker attributes to the proposition (i) makes. For 
example to take the first line; 
i j k 
T F T 
(i) agrees with his own proposition so it is true, G), O'Leary, disagrees that 
he is a fool, so we enter F. (k), Daniels, if he had heard the proposition uttered, 
would agree with its truth value, so we enter T. 
Reading ACROSS the matrix we can differentiate between what each 
speaker heard to be said. To compare each speaker going across the matrix we 
have; 
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i T 
j T 
k F 
This shows that (i), being the speaker of the proposition heard himself 
correctly, soT goes opposite (i). (j) also heard the same as (i) so we putT 
opposite (j), however Daniels (k) misheard what was said, so we put F. To 
show that (i) and (k) both agree about the truth value of the proposition they 
have the same entry going DOWN the matrix; 
i k 
T F T 
T F T 
F T F 
To show (i) and (j) both heard what was said, they have the same entry going 
ACROSS the matrix. 
This leaves Tin the middle bottom line and it is explained by Stalnaker's 
extra information that O'Leary (j) believes falsely that Daniels (k) is a fool. (i) 
and (k) both agree that this is false, while (j) thinks it is true. 
Another way of reading off the matrix is to imagine the possible truth 
values agreed across the top as i (+fool j, -fool k) j (-fool j, +fool k) k (-fool k, 
+fool j) and then read these off as answers to propositions heard down the side 
i (fool to j) j (fool to j) k (fool to k). 
I have given a correlate for the vertical dimension of this matrix, the 
semantic dimension. What of the second, horizontal dimension which 
concerns what was heard to be said. These dimensions correspond, I think to 
two different functions of attributing identity to signs. The first is essentially 
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'symbolic', the truth conditional dimension. The second is essentially 
'indexical', the misunderstanding, or 'misreferencing, misattribution or 
misindexing' of what was said. These semiotic distinctions have consequences 
for the two ways words can be core. 
6 Symbol and Index; Primes and Procedures 
The second of these, we could say, is involved in decisions about the coreness 
of words in contextualized 'utterances', and this relates to their value for the 
utterer as 'indices' (for example in conveying the meaning of 'ductile' in the 
instance I gave previously): and the first is involved in decisions about the 
coreness of words in decontextualized 'sentences' and this relates to their value 
for the analyst as 'symbols' (for example distinguishing 'boy' from 'girl' by 
using +or -MALE in the example above). 
Two distinct functions of the word as sign are therefore involved, as 
Widdowson (1983) has pointed out, those of the 'index' and the 'symbol'. (Is 
Bolinger (1965) perhaps confusing these two when he raises doubts about the 
componential'primeness' of 'seal' or 'knight'? These words are unlikely to be 
of much 'use' because they lack a sufficiently broad range of meaning potential, 
but in principle any word can have value within a semantic system which seeks 
to 'structure' lexical differences in an idealized way, to define them in relation 
to each other regardless of their potential for doing things outside the system. 
See also Lyons (1981:65-66) for a related discussion of the two meanings of 
'basic' words, and (1977:114-119) for the semiotic distinctions made here as 
well as Stubbs (1986:67) who discusses the two senses of 'basic' words in 
relation to their differential function as signs). 
To reiterate the points I have made, there is an important difference 
between knowing 'that' a word has a conventionally accepted semantic 
meaning as a decontextualized initial starting point for these speaker 
negotiations (see also Widdowson's distinction between 'value' and 
'signification' 1979). 
Similarly we must distinguish between the declarative knowledge that the 
abstract sense relations I have described exist between words and an ability to 
realize how these relations are being procedurally activated in discourse. In 
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other words we must distinguish the symbolic value that words contract with 
each other as tokens in decontextualized sentences from the indexical values 
they realize as instantiations of the meanings to be negotiated in utterances. 
7. Pragmatic Competence: Synonymy vs. Equivalence 
Let us take as an example of these differences the notion of a simple sense 
relation like synonymy. In its 'absolute' sense this is taken to mean that two 
words have the same meaning, and can be used interchangeably, in all 
contexts. The difficulty of finding synonyms that match these requirements is 
obvious and has long been acknowledged. (Ullman 1956: Lyons 1968). 
Which of these pairs, for example, matches these criteria? 
tasty spicy strong powerful fast quick 
In fact, as Ullman notes, the extreme redundancy which absolute 
synonymy creates would probably result in one of the terms being dropped 
from the language as having nothing of use to contribute to it, "a luxury that 
language can ill afford", in his own words. 
In contrast to this strict sense of synonymy Roget's Thesaurus takes a 
looser view of the relation and offers, "various synonyms representing 
different shades of meaning of the word 'nice', including, savoury, 
discrimination, exact, good' etc. However, as Roget's preface acknowledges, 
these loose synonyms capture only 'shades' of a shared meaning, and can 
hardly be used interchangeably' in all contexts. (see Lyons 1968:446 for a fuller 
discussion of these points). 
In fact it is easy to construct scenarios where these words are not treated as 
synonyms; 
The lasagne looks nice 
Yes, but I fancy something savoury today 
What about the rissoles then ... 
etc. 
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Such difficulties of deciding on the extent of synonymy arise as a result of 
decontextualising the relationship and treating it within semantics. Semantic 
competence' may mean we have a predisposition to establish and revise these 
working sense relations in actual communication, but as soon as they are 
'activated' by being used they become 'open to interpretation' on the part of the 
users. 
When treated within 'pragmatics' McCarthy has proposed that we relabel 
this relation 'equivalence' to show that a word's, "usefulness as an equivalent 
to another item is a local, existential value ... which is different in kind from 
statements made in a decontextualized, structural description of the lexicon". 
(1987). 
He examines the way speakers project their assumptions about 
equivalence in actual conversation. Typically one speaker chooses to mark a 
particular word with a prominent stressed syllable; e.g. 'want' below, 
1. A: so you WANT to meet HARRY 
and the second speaker is faced with two choices. he can accept the meaning 
chosen by the first speaker, as he does here, 
B: YES and I'm dying to see BILL TOO 
or he can choose to make a word he has selected prominent by stressing it, 
therefore indicating that he wishes to redefine the meaning offered by the first 
speaker in some way, e.g. 
2. B: YES and I'm DYING to see BILL 
In 1. the second speaker is accepting that 'want to' and dying to' are 
equivalent, while in 2. he is redefining or adding to the meaning offered by the 
first speaker. Possibly he wishes to show that 'dying to' carries and added 
dimension of eagerness than 'want to'. 
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We can identify 'eagerness' as a component of 'dying to' and show this 
using a componential grid (see Rudzka 1981, 1985; Channell 1981; 
Lindstromberg 1985): 
describes a could be closer to implies implies 
decision about along the present eagerness seriousness 
the future time away & pleasure &duty 
want to + + 
dying to + + + 
must + + + 
But this is only the result of a post facto analysis and reduces to semantics and 
'signification' what in actual use is a pragmatically determined 'value'. (see 
Widdowson 1979:8). 
Gairns and Redman comment on this as an exercise type (1986:40) that 
"The grid aims to bring into focus the features which distinguish one item from 
another, and shows in detail how items are not truly synonymous", but we 
might add that it fails to show how they can be treated as 'equivalent', as in 1. 
above. (see Robinson 1988b for further discussion of grids). 
8. Building The Discourse Lexicon 
As can be seen from McCarthy's example, the semantic relation of 'unilateral' 
dependency between a headword and its dependent which I attributed to 
semantic structure in Section 3 is paralleled by the creation of the relation 
between an item selected for sense (the head) and the existential paradigm of 
equivalents for which a second speaker may accept the negotiated sense (the 
dependents). As a result, one could say, a consequence of interpreting the 
'equivalence' relations that are signalled and negotiated phonologically is that 
the actual tree like componential structure of the lexicons constructed by 
speakers undergo a temporary realignment or reorganization. 
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For example take the exchange; 
A: He's a BIG man. 
B: He's a whale. 
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If, say 'big' is marked a prominent, and 'whale' is non-prominent, then the 
second 'reifies' or supports the first speaker's initially selected sense paradigm. 
In Brazil's terms, 'whale' is an existential synonym. Semantically we can 
explain this by assuming that 'big' paradigmatically enforces the criteria! 
feature of 'bigness' from the second speakers prototypical knowledge of 
'whale-ness' . In other words the second speaker accepts the paradigm. 
Similarly, if the first speaker had said: 
He's a huge WET. 
and the same non-prominent existential synonym had been selected; 
He's a whale. 
Then this, too, could be explained semantically by assuming that the 
choice of 'wet' had found paradigmatic support from a similar criteria! feature 
in the second speaker's prototypical knowledge of whales. This could perhaps 
be represented using the componential grid devices above. But say 'whale' is 
given prominence by the second speaker (in the first example); he is then heard 
to be redefining the initially offered sense. If could also be given high key and 
marked as contrastive. 
A: He is a BIG man. 
B : He's a WHALE. 
Say that the man is 'rather' fat. This is part of the mutual knowledge they 
share about the man. The redefinition of sense offered by giving 'whale' is 
ambiguous, it could mean he is very large, but not unsightly, or it could mean 
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that he is very fat, grossly overweight in fact. High key would seem to imply 
the latter as it is more intensely contrastive than simply 'large'. (Brazi11985). 
Now whether the first speaker 'agrees' with the 'truth value' of either of 
these possible redefinitions depends on the knowledge he has of whales and 
the componential features it has in his prototype lexicon, i.e. 'large' or 'fat and 
unsightly'. Whether he 'understands' it is being offered as a redefinition 
depends on his hearing what was said, i.e. the fact that it was given 
prominence. These are the two dimensions in Sections 3.i and 3.ii and 
represented in Stalnaker's matrix in Section 5. 
The interaction of these two dimensions is something which is overlooked 
in purely structural semantic analyses of vocabulary like those of Lehrer 
(1975:1983). Lehrer attempt to group wine words into related fields (1975) and 
then to further distinguish them using the features +positive, +negative (too 
much, too young etc.) and +negative (too little, too old etc.) Via this sort of 
analysis she hopes to be able to provide answers to two questions.: 
"First assuming that some of the wine words mean anything at all, even if they 
are to be interpreted subjectively and evaluatively- what is the structural 
analysis of this vocabulary? Second, how do typical (non-expert) wine 
drinkers use these words, and what do they understand when they hear these 
words" (1975:901). 
But by ignoring issues relating to the interaction of speaker/hearer 
perceptions of prominence and use of contrastive key, in the manner just 
described, and restricting her analysis to a semantic classification of the words, 
to what in other words, the participants may or may not 'agree' to be the case 
about the semantics of the words, she cannot hope to give an answer to the 
second question, how such words are used, understood and received; hence 
her conclusion .... "My study of wine words has shown that people do not apply 
words to things in the same way. Is the domain of wine discussion an unusual 
one, or is it fairly typical of speaker's application of words? If the latter is the 
case, then speakers probably do not communicate with each other nearly as 
well as they think they do, since they have no way of knowing that others 
apply words differently. But perhaps they communicate well enough for their 
purposes, even without knowing". (1975:922) 
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Let me try to characterize the interaction of the semantic dimension, with 
information about what is 'understood' to be said, using Lehrer's analysis of 
the semantics of wine words describing 'acidity'. 
ACIDITY 
Too much Too little 
NEGATIVE POSITIVE NEGATIVE 
acetic pricked tart flat 
sour crisp (bland) 
(sour) acidic piquant (flabby) 
(sharp) lively 
(hard) zestful 
tangy 
(from Lehrer 1975:903) 
Let us assume that each of the speakers below has the values either 
+positive or -positive and +acid for the wine under discussion. In addition, let 
us assume that speaker A and speaker B hear each other's contributions clearly, 
but speaker C mistakenly hears B's contribution as non-prominent and -high. 
This means C will not consider it selective for sense, and as offered 'equatively' 
to A's offer. The point at issue here then, is what should C say next- how 
should she continue the conversation. It is not simply a question, as Lehrer 
implies, of speakers 'agreeing' about the semantics of the words, it is also a 
question of speakers 'understanding' how the words are offered. The 
interaction of these two levels leads speakers to construe the possible worlds of 
the other in the way represented the matrix below. 
A: a CRISP little vintage 
B: it's certainly SHARP 
C: __________________? 
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A offers 'crisp' believing the wine to be positive, and acid. B reselects for 
sense, disagreeing with the positive evaluation he considers 'crisp' to carry. C 
agrees with A but hears B's offer as equative. C, then, is in the position of 
hearing both 'crisp' and 'sharp' offered as synonyms. She may well entertain 
this possibility for the purposes of the conversation, although she in fact does 
make a semantic distinction. 
A: +prom 
cont 
+high 
B: +prom 
cont 
+high 
C: -prom 
equat 
-high 
A 
+pos 
+acid 
F 
F 
T 
B 
-pos 
+acid 
T 
T 
F 
c 
+pos 
+acid 
F 
F 
T 
My point here is that the componential knowledge, which may or may not be 
'agreed' and the phonological information, which may or may not have been 
heard and so 'understood', interact to distinguish the possible discourse worlds 
of the participants. This can be represented in the same way that Stalnaker's 
matrix represents the factors contributing to the divergent possible worlds 
from which a discourse might be viewed by involved participants. The 
negotiation of meaning will involve participants in attempts to bring their 
worlds to convergence. 
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9. Defective and Non-Defective Contexts: 
The Lexicon as 1Meaning Potential' 
Such worlds are particular to each time-constrained discourse. Out of a shared 
concern to bring them to convergence speakers build, and share for a time, 
their own system of pragmatic presuppositions. To an extent then, one could 
say, we construct the lexicon afresh each time we speak, but using the 
semantic, decontextualized lexicon as a 'meaning bank', a point of departure 
for the creation of our own on-line, and short lived, discourse worlds. These 
are continually 'updated' in conversation in the manner described in Section 8 
as new propositions one accommodated and added to the conversational 
record. 
There is a final point I wish to make in closing. It concerns perceptions of 
who occupies the position of (i) in what might be called the 'conversational' 
matrix I have been describing. In Stalnaker's matrix, (i) is the privileged point 
of reference, the proposition maker who is always true, and who understands 
what is said. In a sense, in equal encounters is a shared native language, 
participants are always jostling for the position of (i). In another sense it passes 
each time to the latest contributor in the discourse. But in unequal encounters, 
say between native speaker teacher, and non-native speaker learner, where the 
proposition asserted is a lexical meaning, it is most often the teacher who 
assumes the role of (i), and the position is conceded to her by learners. The 
learners world is assumed to be defective. If worlds are not brought into 
convergence, if a learner, say, signals some difficulty in matching the truth 
values that are asserted of a lexical item by the teacher, the teacher will retreat 
to the presuppositions, or components underlying her use of the word. This is 
in a way, 'simplifying' the assertion, via a 'presuppositional procedure'. 
Another procedure is to demonstrate the propositional frame for the word: 
these procedures are illustrated in this example: 
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Learner (NNS English) 
tripod? 
(presuppositional procedure)~ 
(propositional procedure) 
Conclusion 
Interlocutor (NS English) 
and the em video camera is 
supported by a tripod see, here 
... yes .. em .. three legs, see here .. 
tri means three, pod means legs .. 
three legs, iter holds it up, it's 
a sort of stand ... 
... the video stands on it... 
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To the extent that we are developing an awareness of these ways of accepting 
and redefining terms in conversation, then, we are adding to our learner's 
'procedural' knowledge - e.g. their knowledge of 'how' to project 
equivalence, which is different in kind from a knowledge 'that' words are 
synonyms. These production procedures are dependent on assumed-to-be-
shared inferencing procedures , which themselves operate on propositional 
representations of lexical meaning. A large part of a model of how input is 
converted to intake will be concerned with specifying how production and 
inferencing procedures are related, how they lead to change in semantic 
representations, and what features available in the input are triggers for such 
change. In my examples I have looked at discourse intonation and stress, 
within the framework of a model proposed by Brazil (1985), as phonological 
features that may cause learners to adjust or restructure lexical representations 
during negotiation for meaning. This , I have claimed, is an area that has been 
neglected by those researchers interested in the way negotiated input can serve 
as a trigger to second language development. 
• An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 12th Penn Linguistics Colloquium. I 
would like to thank Ellen Prince for the comments she made there. 
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